Zheng Yongnian: China, the U.S., and the Rest
Strategic Alignments in a Shifting World Order
Editor’s Note:
This article is an English adaptation of a widely circulated Chinese-language essay by Professor Zheng Yongnian (郑永年), a leading Chinese scholar of international politics and global strategy. This essay offers a sharp analysis of how countries around the world navigate the intensifying rivalry between China and the United States—and how China should respond with strategic clarity, multilateral vision, and long-term composure. The following version condenses and translates his argument for international audiences.
Original text: https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/vPuzxhUIFIPxBaLe0NF1SA
In the long arc of human history, major powers have always played a decisive role in shaping the international order. Despite the modern emphasis on sovereign equality, not all states hold equal sway over global rules. The influence of great powers is structural—what changes is the way they exercise it: through domination or through inclusion.
In today's turbulent world, China and the United States stand as the two central protagonists. While other nations may rise or fall, the architecture of the global system ultimately hinges on the dynamics between Washington and Beijing. Whether the current order dissolves or a new one takes shape will depend on their ability—or inability—to cooperate. The world watches closely, not only because their competition reverberates globally, but because it provides the strategic backdrop for nearly every other country’s foreign policy.
Six Types of Strategic Behavior in the U.S.-China Rivalry
Since the Trump administration launched a sweeping tariff war against China, nations around the globe have repositioned themselves in relation to the Sino-American rivalry. These positions fall broadly into six categories:
1. Countries That Hope China Will Confront the U.S.
Some nations, especially in the West and parts of Asia, welcome a more assertive China—not because they intend to join Beijing’s side, but because they hope China’s resistance will pressure the U.S. to renew old alliances and grant concessions. For instance, the European Union, despite occasional overtures toward “strategic autonomy,” remains deeply tied to the U.S. security umbrella. France’s President Macron may lament NATO’s “brain death,” but Europe as a whole lacks the political will or capability to decouple from the U.S.
Meanwhile, countries like Japan, South Korea, and several Southeast Asian states maintain hedging strategies. While they benefit economically from ties with China, they remain willing to shift toward Washington when tensions spike, using China’s assertiveness to extract leverage from the U.S.
2. Nations That Hide Behind China
Another subset of countries prefers to let China take the brunt of American pressure. This behavior was evident during the Trump-era trade war and later during the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Although China was not directly involved in the war, many Western narratives grouped China and Russia together, effectively pushing China into the diplomatic line of fire. Countries like India quietly expanded trade with Russia during the crisis, avoiding Western sanctions partly because China absorbed most of the criticism.
This pattern reveals a paradox: the fiercer the U.S.-China conflict becomes, the greater the strategic maneuvering space for smaller countries. By staying neutral or ambiguous, they can pursue maximal gains with minimal risk.
3. Nations Offering "Proof of Loyalty" to the U.S.
Some countries actively seek favor with the U.S. by demonstrating their value as allies against China. Japan is the most illustrative case. Whether it’s offering rare earth processing capabilities or shipbuilding expertise, Tokyo routinely positions itself as an indispensable partner in Washington’s China strategy—even though Trump’s tariffs also targeted Japan.
Despite feeling the heat of America’s unpredictable trade policy, Japan’s strategic class clings to the belief that loyalty will restore its privileged alliance status. This approach is echoed, albeit less overtly, in parts of Europe and elsewhere.
4. States That Urge the U.S. to Stay the Course Against China
Many traditional U.S. allies—notably those invested in the postwar liberal order—fear that a U.S. retreat from global leadership could empower authoritarian competitors. For these nations, China represents a challenge not just geopolitically, but ideologically. The desire to preserve a “liberal international order” drives them to prod the U.S. to maintain its competitive stance against Beijing, using rhetoric rooted in democracy, values, and security.
5. Countries Provoking China to Draw in the U.S.
Certain nations, like the Philippines under recent administrations, have escalated disputes with China—particularly in the South China Sea—not out of sheer defiance, but in the hope that U.S. military backing will follow. Similarly, Taiwan’s pro-independence factions have long believed that a clash with the mainland would compel U.S. intervention.
This strategy relies on the U.S.'s willingness to engage in regional conflicts, a calculation that may not always align with American interests—but which nonetheless increases pressure on Beijing.
6. Actors Trying to Lure China Into Strategic Mistakes
Among the most dangerous tactics are those designed to provoke China into overreactions—particularly on the Taiwan issue. Some governments, including smaller European nations, have deliberately stirred tensions by strengthening unofficial ties with Taipei.
For hardliners in Washington, the Taiwan issue is a lever to derail China’s modernization. By portraying China as an aggressor, they aim to galvanize global opposition. Such strategies are rooted not in solving the Taiwan question, but in triggering China into strategic overreach.
Strategic Clarity: How China Should Respond
In the face of this complex landscape, what kind of diplomatic approach should China adopt? The author outlines three key principles:
1. Anchor Policy in the U.S.-China Structural Dynamic
The U.S.-China relationship is not just another bilateral tie—it is the structural axis of today’s global order. Whether in competition or cooperation, the way China manages this relationship sets the tone for global diplomacy. Smaller countries calibrate their foreign policies based on the state of U.S.-China ties, positioning themselves to extract maximum advantage from perceived imbalances or deadlocks.
Recognizing this, China must clearly define its goals when dealing with the U.S. It must avoid being drawn into reactive or symbolic moves, and instead, ground its actions in a long-term structural strategy. As the author argues, “the Pacific Ocean is big enough to accommodate both China and the U.S.—and the world even more so.”
In practice, this means engaging the U.S. with strategic intent—resisting where necessary, compromising where possible, and never losing sight of the larger structural stakes. Undefined conflict or ambiguous compromise will only lead to strategic drift or error.
2. Understand the Constraints of Smaller States
Second, China must better understand the precarious position of middle and small powers. As the late Singaporean leader Lee Kuan Yew famously warned, “When elephants fight, the grass gets trampled. When elephants make love, the grass still suffers.” His son, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, has often reiterated this view in cautioning against forcing Southeast Asian countries to choose sides in a great power conflict.
Singaporean diplomat Kishore Mahbubani has since added nuance: while small states are wary of great power rivalry, today many aim to remain non-aligned. However, in reality, these states face immense pressure—especially when their economies are export-driven and highly sensitive to U.S. market access.
In Trump's second term, this pressure could intensify. Some ASEAN countries, while seeking to avoid open alignment, may end up conceding to American demands at China’s expense in order to secure access to U.S. markets. This is not ideological alignment, but strategic necessity.
For China, this means acknowledging that smaller countries are often acting out of constraint, not hostility. Understanding their dilemmas can help Beijing avoid overreacting and instead tailor policies that reduce their dependence on binary choices.
3. Practice Inclusive Multilateralism and Shared Leadership
Finally, China must not only act as a great power—it must act as a responsible one. The Cold War offers a cautionary tale: both the U.S. and Soviet Union tried to impose their respective worldviews on smaller nations. This not only bred resistance but ultimately led to overstretch and collapse. The Soviet Union disintegrated under the weight of its own ambitions, and the unipolar moment that followed for the U.S. turned into imperial overreach.
China’s strength, by contrast, has grown without such coercion. Despite persistent “China threat” rhetoric in the West, many countries see Beijing as a disciplined and self-restraining power. Its emphasis on “inclusive multilateralism” suggests a different approach—one that welcomes smaller nations into the process of shaping a more equitable world order.
This is not merely diplomatic rhetoric. China's Belt and Road Initiative, its stance on South-South cooperation, and its call for a multipolar economic system all aim to shift away from a zero-sum global model. The goal is not to supplant the U.S. as a hegemon, but to offer an alternative vision of global leadership—one that empowers rather than coerces.
Replacing Western IR Theory with a New Model
The article closes with a compelling critique of the Western international relations canon. Built largely on assumptions of self-interest, power balancing, and zero-sum logic, much of Western IR theory cannot fully explain China’s foreign policy behavior. Concepts like “realism” and “liberal internationalism” offer limited insight into a country that promotes cooperation without seeking dominance, that wields power but often refrains from using it coercively.
China’s rise thus demands not only a new foreign policy approach but a new theoretical framework—one rooted in China’s actual conduct and diplomatic philosophy. The time has come, the author suggests, to construct international relations theory from a Chinese foundation.
Conclusion: From Great-Power Competition to Global Coexistence
The U.S.-China rivalry is not just a contest of economies or militaries—it is a contest over the future structure of the international system. For many nations caught in the middle, this contest creates both risks and opportunities. Some attempt to leverage the conflict for their own gain. Others seek shelter in ambiguity. Still others try to provoke or manipulate the giants to advance their interests.
In this context, China’s strategic response must be clear, consistent, and future-focused. It must navigate great-power competition without allowing itself to be provoked into error. It must understand and respect the constraints faced by smaller nations. And most importantly, it must lead through openness, inclusion, and a willingness to share global responsibilities.
The old order may be fading. But if China can blend strength with restraint, vision with pragmatism, and power with partnership, it has the opportunity not just to shape a new order—but to define a new kind of global leadership.